Request and response integrity
Desktop requests use Ed25519 device signatures over canonical metadata and an exact body hash. Timestamp and nonce checks reject stale or reused requests. Responses are signed against the originating request ID and exact returned body so clients can pin and verify the service decision.
A release-hash policy detects when an ordinary client reports bytes that differ from an owner-published build. It is tamper telemetry, not hardware attestation: software running on a customer-controlled machine can be patched to claim the expected hash, so authorization remains server-side.
Short-lived, revocable sessions
Access credentials expire quickly, refresh values rotate, and server-side session state can be revoked. License revocation closes dependent sessions, refresh families, device bindings, and step-up access.
Sensitive storage
Browser session nonces, refresh credentials, trace tokens, and unused license lookup values are stored as one-way hashes or protected ciphertext as appropriate. Private device keys remain on the client. Customer release bytes remain on the application owner’s download host; Konvoa stores only scoped file metadata, the public HTTP or HTTPS URL, and an optional digest. A retired Windows client can use an isolated compatibility bridge that holds entitled bytes only long enough to encrypt and return one bounded response; those bytes are not retained.
Operational controls
Administrative and customer surfaces use same-origin checks, CSRF controls, bounded input, security headers, and account-scoped data access. Rate limits apply to both network and identity dimensions. Modern application URLs are returned as signed metadata and are not fetched by Konvoa. The isolated legacy bridge follows no redirects, accepts only public destinations, forwards no client credentials, and enforces ticket, size, time, account, and concurrency limits. Its optional artifact verification is configured independently; use HTTPS whenever legacy verification is disabled.
Origin TLS must use a verified certificate and an end-to-end strict mode at the edge. Application-layer signatures complement TLS; they do not replace it.